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“Creating a Financial Stake in College” is a four-part series of reports that focuses on the 
relationship between children‖s savings and improving college success. This series examines: (1) 
why policymakers should care about savings, (2) the relationship between inequality and bank 
account ownership, (3) the connections between savings and college attendance, and (4) 
recommendations to refine children‖s savings account proposals. This series of reports presents 
evidence from a set of empirical studies conducted by Elliott and colleagues on children‖s savings 
research, with an emphasis on low-income children, relevant to large-scale policy proposals. One 
such proposal, The ASPIRE Act, would encourage savings by opening an account for every 
newborn child, seeding the account with an initial deposit and progressively matching 
contributions, and designating accumulated resources to support post-secondary education or 
other targeted uses such as homeownership or retirement.  Collectively, these reports build on the 
compelling observation that children with savings in their name are given a stake in their future. 
As such, they are more inclined to take control over their educational experience and feel more 
empowered to attend college and persist through graduation. 
 
Report II presents evidence that structural inequalities have 
created an unequal playing field for low-income families 
and their children to build assets. Children in families with 
higher incomes and greater assets are more likely to have 
relationships with banks and access to other institutional 
structures that support savings (Beverly & Sherraden, 1999; 
Sherraden, 1991). Because children‖s savings is an 
important predictor of children‖s educational outcomes 
(e.g., Elliott, 2011; Elliott & Beverly, 2011a, b), inequity in 
institutionalized opportunities to save and accumulate 
wealth among children may weaken the effectiveness of the 
education institution to act as the “great equalizer” in 
society. Thus, children‖s savings accounts must be carefully 
structured to address these inequities for children from 
low-income families. An institutional theory of savings 
perspective is helpful to identify the types of structures and 
mechanisms that promote savings, some of which may be 
particularly relevant to an examination of how children 
learn to interact with their finances. 
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Children’s Savings through an 
Institutional Lens  
Economic socialization theory emphasizes the role that the 
family plays in helping influence children‖s attitudes and 
behaviors toward saving. This theory builds on the 
commonly held belief that family is one of the key 
institutions in which children‖s development takes place 
(e.g., Bronfenbrenner, 1979). According to economic 
socialization theory, children and adolescents learn 
financial practices through observing and modeling their 
parent‖s behaviors (e.g., Moschis, 1987) as well as through 
education, and they develop skills and strategies through 
parental guidance and self-reflection (Webley, 2005).  For 
children, saving is almost always connected to a larger 
social unit or family and involves negotiating with parents 
(Sonuga-Barke & Webley, 1993; Webley, Levine, & Lewis, 
1991). Even when they open their own accounts, children 
are often supported by parents or other family members. 
Moreover, many children must rely on some form of 
allowance from their parents as their main source of 
income. From this perspective, the story of why some 
children may have savings of their own that can be used for 
school and others do not is one of the successes or failures 
of parents as economic socializers.  
 
The act of saving is not purely an individual 
act determined solely by human capital or 
even social background, but it also requires 
access to the capabilities financial institutions 
provide.  
 
Conversely, the institutional theory of saving emphasizes 
the institutional determinants of saving and asset 
accumulation and the important role that financial 
institutions play in shaping children‖s saving attitudes and 
behaviors.  This theory is more concerned with the attitudes 
and behaviors of low socioeconomic status (SES) 
populations than it is with high SES families and their 
children (Sherraden & Barr, 2005). Up until now, it has 
been used primarily to explain saving among adults. 
According to institutional theorists, institutions provide the 
context within which all human interaction takes place 
(e.g., Nee & Ingram, 1998). Sen (1999) states, “Individuals 
live and operate in a world of institutions. Our 
opportunities and prospects depend crucially on what 
institutions exist and how they function” (Sen, 1999, p. 
142). Sherraden (1991) provides a broad definition of 
institutions used in this report, “formal and informal 
socioeconomic relationships, rules, and incentives, 
including the organization of capitalist enterprises and 
voluntary associations, and all the laws, procedures, and 
agents of the state that affect organizations and 
households” (p. 124).  
 
Structural Failure: Why Low 
Socioeconomic Status Children Fail to 
Save  
An institutional theory of saving builds on the premise that 
acquisition of financial knowledge and resources are 
strongly influenced by structural failures related to social 
class and race. In describing the American economic 
environment, Mark Rank (2004) states “the game itself is 
structured in a way that ultimately produces economic 
losers” (p. 65). Institutional theory posits that structural 
failures make it difficult for low SES families to provide 
their children with the connections within and between 
financial institutions they need to be able to save and 
accumulate assets. Within the framework presented here, a 
family‖s SES is based on income, education, occupation, 
wealth, and connections to financial institutions. A key 
component of institutional theory is that the act of saving is 
not purely an individual act determined solely by human 
capital or even social background, but it also requires access 
to the capabilities financial institutions provide (Sherraden, 
1991).  
 
An important way that people connect to financial 
institutions in a capitalistic society like the United States is 
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by owning assets (Sherraden, 1991). Sherraden (1991) 
describes this process of assets begetting assets:  
 
Owning financial assets, for most people, is an 
educational process. People pay attention to the 
investment, manage it, make some successful 
decisions, make some mistakes, seek out 
information, and throughout this process, gain a 
greater financial knowledge and sophistication. 
With this experience, people are likely to display 
greater interest, greater effort, and greater success 
in additional financial endeavors. This added 
effort, on the average, leads to increased income 
and accumulation of assets. (p. 156)  
 
Assuming this is true, structural failings put low SES 
children at a competitive disadvantage with high SES 
children. In this way, financial institutions, which are 
intended to promote saving and asset accumulation at the 
individual level, create opportunities for saving and asset 
accumulation at the societal level.  
 
In sum, institutional theory suggests that low SES families 
who generally do not own assets because of structural 
failings, are less likely to have connections to financial 
institutions that are designed to help them save and 
accumulate assets. Lack of assets and connections to 
financial institutions place low SES children in a 
disadvantaged position from the outset in comparison to 
their high SES counterparts, who are more likely to save 
and accumulate assets. 
 
Extent of Income and Wealth Inequality 
at the Household Level  
The extent of income and wealth inequality in the United 
States is far-reaching, favoring a small percentage of 
households at the upper end and leaving a majority 
vulnerable at the lower end. These inequalities appear to be 
on the rise and are especially evident along lines of class 
and race (DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, & Smith, 2010; Frank, 
2009; Mishel, Bernstein, & Shierholz, 2009). For instance, 
since 1979 there has been roughly a two percent decrease in 
the share of income received by the lowest 20 percent of 
households, while the top 20 percent of households 
enjoyed a four percent increase (Mishel, et al. 2009). 
Following the recent economic recession in 2009, the 
lowest 20 percent of households experienced an additional 
decrease of roughly six percent compared with a 1 percent 
increase enjoyed by the top 20 percent of households 
(DeNavas-Walt, et al. 2010). About 13 percent of low-income 
households with children have a 50-50 chance of 
experiencing a drop in income during any given year, and 
60 percent of those households do not recoup their losses 
within that year (Acs & Nichols, 2010). Income inequality in 
the United States is also apparent by race. Median income 
among white households has risen over the last several 
decades, while black and Latino households have 
experienced periods of decline (Mishel, et al., 2009). The 
median income of white households in 2009 was $30,941 
compared with $18,135 for black and $15,063 for Latino 
households, or about 59 percent and 49 percent the median 
income received by white households (DeNavas-Walt, et al. 
2010).  
 
Likewise, household wealth has followed a similar trend. 
The top 20 percent of households, for instance, enjoyed an 
11 percent increase in the share of the net worth distribution 
between 2001 and 2004 compared with the lowest 20 
percent of households who experienced a decrease of 
almost an equal percentage (Mishel, et al. 2009). To put 
this in dollar terms, the top 20 percent of households 
received almost $20 million of the net worth in 2004 while 
the bottom 20 percent of households were in debt about 
$11,000 (Mishel, et al. 2009). Wealth inequality also exists 
along racial lines. A report released by the Institute on 
Assets and Social Policy in 2010 found that the gap in net 
worth between whites and blacks quadrupled over the last 
decade (Shapiro, Meschede, & Sullivan, 2010). According to 
their report, white households held up to $100,000 in 
median net worth in 2007 compared with black families 
who held up to $7,000, or about 7 percent of the net worth 
held by white households (Shapiro, et al. 2010). A more 
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recent report by the Pew Foundation echoes these findings, 
specifically that whites held up to $113,148 in median net 
worth in 2009 compared with $6,325 held by Latinos and 
$5,677 held by blacks, or six percent and five percent, 
respectively, of the net worth held by whites (Kochhar, Fry, 
& Taylor, 2011). While all households experienced a decline 
in net worth during the recent economic recession, black 
and Latino households experienced substantial declines of 
53 percent and 66 percent between 2005 and 2009 
compared with a 16 percent decline in net worth held by 
white households (Kochhar, et al. 2011). 
 
Structural Underpinnings of Household 
Wealth Inequality  
Structural underpinnings of household wealth inequality 
include factors as diverse as the U.S. tax code, access to 
credit, appreciation of home values, and intergenerational 
transfer of wealth (for a more detailed account than is 
provided in this paper, see Conley, 1999; Lui, Robles, 
Leondar-Wright, Brewer, & Adamson, 2006; Oliver & 
Shapiro, 2006; Shapiro, 2004; Sherraden, 1991; Williams 
Shanks, 2005). Regarding the tax code, for example, the 
poorest Americans continue to see their real incomes drop 
while at the same time their federal tax rate continues to 
rise; in contrast, the richest Americans continue to see their 
income rise and their tax rate fall, if they pay taxes at all 
(Sherraden, 1991). The housing market underpins 
household wealth inequality between whites and blacks 
through (1) more limited access to credit to purchase a 
home for blacks, (2) higher prices of credit and interest 
rates for blacks, and (3) lower appreciation of home values 
among homes owned by blacks (Shapiro, 2004). 
Intergenerational transfer of wealth (Kotlikoff & Summers, 
1981), the Homestead Act (Williams Shanks, 2005), and a 
host of other instances of government action or inaction 
(Lui et al. 2006) have also contributed to wealth inequality 
in America. 
 
Given this well-documented history of structural inequality 
in America, it is important to determine whether or not low 
SES families are in an unfavorable position from an 
institutional perspective to provide effective economic 
socialization to their children. The next section proposes a 
framework that may help assess how structural failings 
affect SES families‖ capacity to effectively economically 
socialize their children.  
 
Structural underpinnings of household 
wealth inequality include factors as diverse as 
the U.S. tax code, access to credit, 
appreciation of home values, and 
intergenerational transfer of wealth.  
 
Framework for Assessing the Family as 
an Effective Economic Socializer  
Researchers have identified a number of institutional 
features that influence people‖s behavior regarding saving 
and asset accumulation. Collectively, these characteristics 
“construct” the framework for understanding how 
institutions shape financial outcomes, and thus can be used 
to assess whether institutions have the capacity to provide 
children with the types of rules (i.e., institutional structure) 
required for promoting saving and asset accumulation. The 
constructs are: (1) access, (2) information, (3) incentives, (4) 
facilitation, (5) expectations, (6) restrictions, and (7) security 
(Sherraden and Barr, 2005).   
 
The family is a type of social institution; in fact, under the 
current economic paradigm, families are seen as the 
primary institution for socializing children into the adult 
economy (e.g., Moschis, 1987). Families of different income 
and wealth levels may influence the ability of families to 
effectively socialize their children in positive financial 
practices.  
 
Below is a short description of the seven institutional 
constructs and how each potentially impacts the capacity of 
low SES families to save and accumulate assets.  
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Access 
Access refers to children‖s ability to connect with a formal 
banking institution. Research on children‖s saving suggests 
that the current banking paradigm has failed to provide low 
SES children with the same access to federally insured 
accounts that higher-income children enjoy. For example, 
Kim, LaTailade, & Kim (2011) use data from the Panel Study 
of Income Dynamics (PSID) and its Child Development 
Supplement (CDS) to test whether access to savings among 
children 12 to 18 is associated with family economic 
resources. They find that the more net worth a family has 
the more likely children are to have savings of their own—
that is, assets beget assets. Further, the less economic strain 
a family reports, the more likely children are to have 
savings of their own. They also find that a father‖s 
education and race are predictors of having a savings 
account. In the only study found that uses a sample of low-
income children (household income below $50,000), 
Friedline (in press) finds that whether or not parents have 
savings for their child (age 12 to 15) is predictive of whether 
the child has savings of her own. However, low-income 
children are far less likely to have savings of their own (38 
percent) when compared to higher income (household 
income of $50,000 or above) children (69 percent). 
Moreover, she finds that low-income children are far less 
likely to have parents that have saved for them (56 percent) 
than higher-income parents (80 percent). While Ashby, 
Schoon, and Webley (in press) find, in a British sample, 
that family income does not have a direct relationship to 
children‖s savings, they do find an indirect relationship 
through parenting style. Higher family income is associated 
with parents that act authoritatively, which in turn, is 
associated with having savings as a child. Overall, these 
findings provide some evidence for the proposition that low 
SES families lack the institutional structure to provide 
children with the same access to the formal banking system 
that higher-income children enjoy.       
 
Information  
Information refers to knowledge about policies, services, or 
products, as well as knowledge that may contribute to 
successful performance. Families are considered to be 
children‖s main source of information on financial issues 
(e.g., Moschis, 1987). However, research shows low SES 
families have less financial knowledge (Loibl, Grinstein-
Weiss, Zhan, & Red Bird, 2010; Zhan, Anderson, & Scott, 
2006) and fewer discussions about family financial matters 
(Bowman, 2011; Sherraden & McBride, 2010) than middle- 
and upper-income families.   
 
Incentives  
Incentives are financial rates of return, as well as 
nonfinancial “pay offs” for participation. Research shows 
that low SES families are more likely to use alternative 
forms of banking such as check cashing institutions or pay 
day loans instead of formal banks (Barr, 2004; Rhine, 
Greene, & Toussaint-Comeau, 2006). With respect to rates 
of return, these types of financial institutions can actually 
be characterized as punitive. For example, Barr (2004) 
estimates that the average loan from a payday lending 
establishment is $300, but the average fee for a single, two-
week loan of $300 is about $54.     
 
Facilitation  
Facilitation refers to any form of assistance in saving. In the 
case of children, an important aspect of facilitation is 
whether or not they have parents who encourage them to 
open a bank account. Children who have parents who 
encourage them to use a bank account save more than 
others (Webley & Nyhus, 2006). Descriptive data tell us, 
however, that low-income children (38 percent) are far less 
likely to have a savings account than higher-income 
children (69 percent) (Friedline, in press). In addition to 
encouraging children to save in a bank account, families 
also facilitate saving by providing children with an 
allowance (Furnham, 1999). For example, Furnham (1999) 
finds that children who receive an allowance are more likely 
to save. However, findings are mixed on whether children 
living in higher-income families are more likely to receive 
an allowance than those living in lower-income families. 
Mortimer, Dennehy, Lee, and Finch (1994) find that 
income is associated with whether children receive an 
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allowance or not in the first place. In contrast, in a sample 
of high-ability children, Miller and Yung (1990) find no 
evidence of differences in receipt of allowance by income 
but they do find evidence to suggest that children living 
with mothers with higher levels of education were more 
likely to receive an allowance than those living with 
mothers with less education. Overall, findings seem to 
suggest that low SES children may be less likely to receive 
an allowance in comparison to higher-income children.      
 
Expectations  
Expectations are embodied in institutional features such as 
saving targets and social pressure from staff and peers. A 
large body of social-psychological research confirms that 
people tend to try to do what others expect them to do. 
However, low SES families are more likely to distrust the 
formal banking system (Barr & Blank, 2009; Retsinas & 
Belsky, 2005), and tend to pass these perceptions and 
practices onto their children (Grinstein-Weiss, Spader, Yeo, 
Taylor, & Freeze, 2010; John, 1999; Moschis, 1985; Shim, 
Barber, Card, Xiao, & Serido, 2010). 
 
Restrictions  
Restrictions are ways that institutions limit access and use 
of savings. According to Sherraden and Barr (2005), two 
main types of restrictions are constraints on access and 
constraints on use. Thus, a key way that people restrict 
access to their savings is by saving at a formal banking 
institution (Sherraden & Barr, 2005). If low SES children 
are less likely to be banked, it is reasonable to conclude that 
they also are less likely to benefit from the restrictions 
banks provide. Being unbanked, can be particularly 
harmful to low SES families and children because research 
shows that they are more likely to have their savings drawn 
down by family and friendship networks if the money is 
saved somewhere in the house, for example (Chiteji & 
Hamilton, 2002).      
 
Security  
Security refers to having a safe place to put money. Low 
SES families are far less likely to connect their children to a 
federally insured bank than children from higher SES 
families. Federally insured banks provide people with safety 
of deposits in member banks currently up to $250,000. 
Having money in a bank also is a protection from theft and 
natural disasters such as fire or flooding. Savings at home 
may not be protected from such threats.       
 
Existing evidence suggests that low SES children start off at 
a disadvantage regarding their family‖s institutional 
capacity as economic socializers, in comparison to their 
high SES counterparts. This situation all but assures that 
low SES families will be more likely to fail at socializing 
their children as savers and that low SES children will be 
more likely to fail to open accounts and accumulate assets.  
 
Does Structural Inequality Begin with a 
Bank Account?1  
Accordingly to the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 67 
percent of all children in the US in 2002 had a bank 
account (see Table 1, Column 1).  However, when other 
characteristics such as race and gender, head‖s marital 
status, and class are examined, large disparities become 
apparent. White, female children who live in households 
where the head is married, has a four-year degree or more, 
a high-income, and high net worth are far more likely to be 
banked than their peers. Other findings include: 
 
 83 percent of high-income and 38 percent of low-
income children are banked, a gap of 45 percent.  
 74 percent of white and 35 percent of black 
children are banked, a gap of 39 percent.   
 78 percent of children who live in high-net-worth 
households and 43 percent of children living in 
negative-net-worth households are banked, a gap of 
35 percent. 
 
Among children ages 13 to 17, 50 percent have college 
savings (see Table 1, Column 2), which is measured 
according whether or not children have designated a 
portion of their savings for school purposes like college.
                                                          
1 The data reported in this and the next section is original data 
generated for the purposes of this report. 
 Table 1: Percent of children ages 13 – 17 in 2002 with traditional and school savings, percent of young adults ages 18 – 22 in 2007 
with traditional savings and the percent of young adults who have traditional savings in 2007 with traditional savings as children 
in 2002 by race, gender, marital status, and class (N=729) 
Covariates 
Percent Children 
with Bank Account 
in 2002 (n=485) 
Percent Children 
School Savers in 
2002 (n=361) 
Young Adult Traditional Savers in 2007  
Percent 
Over all  
(n=614) 
Percent with Bank 
Account in 2002 
& 2007  
(n=449) 
Percent with 
Bank Account 
Only in 2007 
(n=165) 
 White 74 55 90 94 78 
 Black 35 28 59 74 52 
 Female 70 53 86 92 72 
 Male 63 46 83 93 65 
 Married 73 54 90 95 77 
 Not Married 47 38 67 81 55 
 Head has four-year degree 
or more 
81 58 96 98 84 
 Head has some  
 College 
75 54 91 93 82 
 Head has high school  
degree or less 
53 42 74 87 60 
 High income 83 64 95 96 91 
 Moderate income  74 52 90 94 80 
 Low income   38 31 63 79 54 
 High net worth 78 60 92 95 84 
 Moderate net worth 47 31 69 85 55 
 Negative net worth 43 29 69 83 58 
 Full sample 67 50 84 93 68 
Source: Weighted data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and its supplements, the 2002 Child Development 
Supplement (CDS) and the 2007 Transition into Adulthood (TA) supplement. Data are imputed using multiple imputations. 
The same children are followed through young adulthood. 
Note: Table results are rounded to the nearest percent. For more information on data and methods see Appendix A.  
 
Not surprisingly, fewer children have college savings (50 
percent) than simply have a bank account with no college 
savings (67 percent). Similar to findings on just having an 
account, findings suggest the largest college savings gaps 
exist by class and race. For example: 
 
 64 percent of high-income and 31 percent of low-
income children have college savings, a gap of 33 
percent. 
 60 percent of children who live in high-net-worth 
households and 29 percent of children living in 
negative-net-worth households have college 
savings, a gap of 31 percent. 
 55 percent of white and 28 percent of black 
children have college savings, a gap of 27 percent.   
 
Similar patterns of inequality are seen in young adult‖s 
savings (see Table 1, Column 3). High percentages (84 
percent) of young adults are banked in 2007. Almost all 
white, female, young adults who live in households where 
the head is married, has four-years or more of college, and 
live in high-income or high-net-worth households as 
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children are banked as young adults. The extremely high 
account ownership rate may be explained, at least in part, 
by the fact that this study includes young adults with either 
a checking or savings account. The inclusion of checking 
accounts at a time when young adults are becoming less 
reliant on parents may help explain why so many young 
adults have an account in the aggregate data. Additional 
findings include: 
 
 95 percent of high-income and 63 percent of low-
income young adults are banked, a gap of 32 
percent. 
 90 percent of white and 59 percent of black young 
adults are banked, a gap of 31 percent.   
 92 percent of young adults who live in high-net-
worth households and 69 percent of young adults 
who live in negative net worth households are 
banked, a gap of 23 percent.2 
 
If young adults have an account as children, they are more 
likely to have an account and have more saved as an adult, 
when compared to children who do not (see Table 1, 
Column 4). If children have savings at an early age, they are 
more likely to have savings as young adults.3 In the 
aggregate sample, 93 percent of children with savings also 
have savings as young adults. In contrast, 68 percent of 
young adults who had no savings as children have savings 
as young adults. There is a 25 percentage point difference 
between the two groups.   
 
While gaps in savings remain by race, gender, marital 
status, and class, descriptive findings suggest that all 
children are much more likely to be banked as adults in 
2007 if they had savings as children in 2002. For example, 
although only 35 percent of black children between the ages 
of 13-17 had savings in 2002, 74 percent of this group 
continues to have savings as young adults. Similarly, only 
52 percent of black children who were not banked as 
                                                          
2 Marital status also has a 23 percent college savings gap. 
3 It should be noted, because data are not collected annually, we 
cannot rule out that a child who is 13 in 2002 did not obtain 
savings at age 14 – 17, for example. Therefore, it might be that 
some children, who had savings in 2007 but not in 2002, had it at 
some other point during their childhood.   
children have savings as young adults. In the case of 
marital status, head‖s education, household income, and 
net worth, all children are more likely to have savings as 
young adults if they had savings as children.   
 
A 2011 study using multivariate analysis finds that children 
who had savings are statistically more likely to have savings 
as young adults after controlling for such things as race, 
income, wealth, future orientation, and household size 
(Friedline, Elliott, & Nam, 2011). Ashby et al. (2011) find 
similar results. 
 
Perpetuating Wealth Inequality: The 
Case of Savings Amount in Young 
Adulthood  
In addition to examining who saves among children and 
young adults, this report provides data on the amount of 
savings young adults have in traditional accounts (see Table 
2).4 While ownership may help change children‖s attitudes 
and behaviors about college, it is also important that 
children are able to finance college. Research on the 
amount children have saved in a regular bank account, 
therefore, is also important for determining whether other 
types of accounts such as CSAs are needed.  
 
On average, the aggregate data indicate that young adults 
have about $2,466 saved (see Table 2, Column 1). While not 
enough to pay for college, it could go a long way in helping 
children pay for such things as books, school fees, clothes, 
social events, field trips, software, tutoring, or even a 
computer. These are all important resources for children 
achieving positive educational outcomes. For example, it is 
no longer sufficient for a student to turn in a hand written 
                                                          
4 Since there is a high amount of missing (roughly 50 percent) on 
the savings amount variables among children 13 – 17, savings 
amounts are not reported for children. According to Little and 
Rubin (2002), a rule of thumb for about how many data can be 
missing and still obtain accurate results from multiple 
imputations is approximately 20 percent. To give the reader an 
idea of the amount children had in savings, average basic savings 
without imputing was $1,436.10 in the aggregate sample, and for 
college savings it was $388.22. However, due to missing data, 
generalizability is questionable and findings are not reported.  
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paper without citations. Computers and the internet have 
almost become basic survival needs for a student in the 21st 
century—nearly as important to their success as food, 
shelter, and clothing. Finland has made fast internet access 
a legal right (Ahmed, 2009), an extreme example that may 
become more common. From this perspective, providing all 
children with the same opportunity to use computers and 
the internet are essential to creating a level playing field. 
Lack of savings for such items can create an unfair 
educational disadvantage. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Mean amount of traditional savings among young adults ages 18–22 in 2007, and the mean amount of traditional 
savings in 2007 among young adults with and without traditional savings as children in 2002 by race, gender, marital status, 
and class (N=729) 
Covariates 
Mean Dollar Amount of Traditional Savings among Young Adults in 2007  
Overall (n=614) 
 With Traditional Savings in 2002 & 
2007 (n=449) 
With Traditional Saving Only in 
2007 (n=165) 
 White 2,661 2,716 2,508 
 Black 1,666 1,404 1,805 
 Female 2,043 3,024 1,729 
 Male 2,891 2,181 2,662 
 Married 2,669 2,686 2,624 
 Not Married 1,865 2,095 1,664 
 Head has four-year degree 
or more 
2,569 2,731 1,844 
 Head has some college 2,770 2,571 3,397 
 Head has high school 
degree or less 
2,244 2,452 2,007 
 High income 3,443 3,386 3,756 
 Moderate income  2,200 2,220 2,141 
 Low income   1,931 1,979 1,903 
 High net worth 2,780 2,767 2,834 
 Moderate net worth 2,139 2,168 2,115 
 Negative net worth 1,597 1,738 1,490 
 Full sample 2,466 2,581 2,237 
Source: Weighted data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and its supplements, the 2002 Child Development 
Supplement (CDS) and the 2007 Transition into Adulthood (TA) supplement. Data are imputed using multiple imputations. 
The same children are followed through young adulthood. 
Note: For more information on data and methods, see Appendix A.  
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Young adults‖ savings amounts display familiar patterns of 
inequality when disaggregated by race, marital status, and 
class but not by gender and head‖s education. Some 
highlights are: 
 
 Young adults from high-income households have 
about one and three quarters more saved than low-
income young adults ($3,443 vs. $1,931, 
respectively).  
 Young adults from high-net-worth households 
have about one and three quarters more saved than 
young adults from negative-net-worth households 
($2,780 vs. $1,597, respectively). 
 White young adults have about one and half times 
more saved than black young adults ($2,661 vs. 
$1,666, respectively). 
 
Overall, the descriptive data present a mixed picture for the 
proposition that owning savings as a child leads to more 
savings as a young adult (see columns 2 & 3). For example, 
black young adults who had savings as children have fewer 
saving than black young adults who did not have savings as 
children. In contrast, with the exception of black young 
adults, traditionally disadvantaged groups—specifically, 
young adults who are female, who live in households where 
the head is single, who live in households where the head 
has a high school degree or less, who live in low-income 
households, and young adults who live in negative net 
worth households as children—save more if they had 
savings as a child. Further, in the aggregate data, young 
adults who had traditional savings as children save slightly 
more on average ($2,581) than if they did not have savings 
as children ($2,237).     
 
Leveling the Playing Field: How can 
Children’s Savings Programs Help?  
Although the descriptive evidence that low SES children are 
far less likely to have a savings account in the first place 
along with the finding that children‖s savings is associated 
with young adulthood savings provide some rationale for an 
institutional approach to children‖s saving, additional 
reasons exist as well. First, there is evidence of structural 
failure and that low SES families are more likely to have low 
capacity for being good economic socializers. Second, there 
is the fact that previous models that primarily use an 
economic socialization approach are weak predictors of 
young adult savings.2 For example, Ashby, Schoon, and 
Webley (in press) find that their economic socialization 
model is a weak predictor of young adult savings (McKelvey 
& Zavoina pseudo-R2 equals 13 percent of savings in 
adulthood in the aggregate sample and 21percent of savings 
in the sample of people who live alone). While pseudo R2‖s 
cannot be compared across different datasets, they do 
suggest that, in a particular study, a model is either a good 
predictor of the outcome or not. Friedline, Elliott, and Nam 
(2011), find that their model is a relatively weak predictor of 
young adult savings (McFadden‖s pseudo-R2 equals 17 
percent or 21 percent depending upon the type of 
propensity score analysis used). Similarly, Friedline‖s and 
Elliott‖s (2011) model is also a weak predictor of savings 
(McFadden‖s pseudo-R2 equals 14 percent among white 
young adult savings and 26 percent among blacks).  
 
Based on this evidence, there is solid ground for suggesting 
that low SES children may require support from federal 
institutions to save and build assets. Such support is not so 
unusual. In fact, asset theorists contend that just about all 
saving and asset accumulation is made possible by 
institutions (Sherraden, 1991). Much of this institutional 
support comes through tax incentives directed increasingly 
at middle- and upper-income households for the purpose of 
helping them save and accumulate assets (Howard, 1997; 
Sherraden, 1991). Common examples that almost 
exclusively benefit middle- and upper-income households 
are tax exclusions for employer-sponsored pension 
contributions and earnings (e.g., 401k plans), and the home 
mortgage deduction. Low SES families are far more likely 
to work at jobs that do not offer 401k plans (Mishel et al., 
2009), and they are far less likely to own their home in the 
first place (Rank & Hirschl, 2010). Given this, Sherraden 
and Barr (2005) aptly suggest that “until everyone has the 
same institutional opportunities and public subsidies for 
asset accumulation, it is not possible to know whether their 
reactions to institutional structures would be different from 
others” (pp. 4-5).  
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When discussing institutions within the applied social 
science context, Sherraden and Barr (2005) state that they 
can be thought of as “interventions, designed to alter 
behaviors and outcomes for individuals” (p. 8). From this 
perspective, children‖s savings programs are a type of 
institution developed for the purpose of assisting low SES 
children to save and accumulate assets. Child Savings 
Accounts (CSAs) have been proposed as a potentially novel 
and promising institution meant to promote children 
savings and asset accumulation (Boshara, 2003; Goldberg 
& Cohen, 2000; Sherraden, 1991). An example of a CSA 
policy is the America Saving for Personal Investment, 
Retirement, and Education Act (ASPIRE). ASPIRE has a 
number of features that may help augment low SES 
families‖ capacity to function as an effective economic 
socializer. Below, the institutional framework introduced 
earlier in this report illustrates how the ASPIRE Act, as 
currently constructed can potentially augment low SES 
families‖ capacity to function effectively as economic 
socializers:    
 
Access – “KIDS Accounts,” or a savings account for every 
newborn, would be created, ensuring universal access.  
 
Information – Opportunities for financial education would 
be provided to all children.  
 
Incentives – All children would be provided with an initial 
$500 deposit. Moreover, children living in households with 
incomes below the national median would be eligible for an 
additional contribution of up to $500 at birth and a savings 
incentive of $500 per year in matching funds for amounts 
saved in accounts. Lastly, children would be able to make 
tax-free withdrawals. 
 
Facilitation – Accounts would be opened automatically for 
all children born in the US when their social security card 
is issued. Further, the initial deposit and match would be 
automatically deposited in the children‖s account.    
 
Expectations – Adopting a national children savings 
program like proposed in the ASPIRE Act would send the 
message to all children that Americans save for things like 
post-secondary education, home ownership, and 
retirement.  
 
Restrictions – Access to funds in the account would be 
restricted by age and by use. Children could not make a 
withdrawal from the account until they turned 18, and they 
would be restricted to use savings for (1) post-secondary 
education, (2) first-time home purchase, or (3) retirement 
security.  
 
Security – The accounts would be federally insured.  
 
As proposed, a national savings program would provide 
children with an account, initial deposit, and match 
savings. If it is true that assets beget assets, a national 
savings program may be an important first step to reverse 
structural inequality in regards to saving and asset 
accumulation among low SES children. 
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Appendix A: Methods   
 
Data. This study uses longitudinal data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and its supplements, the Child 
Development Supplement (CDS) and the Transition into Adulthood supplement (TA). The PSID is a nationally representative 
longitudinal survey of US individuals and families that began in 1968. The PSID collects data on such items as employment, 
income and assets. The CDS was administered to 3,563 PSID respondents in 1997 to collect a wide range of data on parents and 
their children, aged birth to 12 years. Questions covered a broad range of developmental outcomes across the domains of health, 
psychological well-being, social relationships, cognitive development, achievement, motivation, and education. Follow-up 
surveys were administered in 2002 and 2007. The TA supplement, administered in 2005 and 2007, measures outcomes for 
young adults who participated in earlier waves of the CDS and were no longer in high school.  
 
The three data sets are linked using PSID, CDS, and TA map files containing family and personal ID numbers. The linked data 
sets provide a rich opportunity for analyses in which data collected at one point in time can be used to predict outcomes at a later 
point in time and stable background characteristics can be used as covariates. Because the PSID initially oversampled low-
income families descriptive analyses are weighted using the last observed weight variable as recommended by the PSID manual 
(Gouskova, 2001).  
 
Savings variables. Four measures of children‖s savings are used in this study: children‖s traditional savings in 2002, children‖s 
college savings 2002, young adult‖s traditional savings in 2007, and young adult‖s traditional savings amount 2007. 
 
Children‖s traditional savings 2002: Children ages 13 to 17 are asked whether or not they have a savings or bank account in their 
name. This is a dichotomous variable with response options including, yes and no. Data for this variable is available from the 
2002 CDS.  
 
Children‖s college savings 2002: If children (ages 13 to 17) have a traditional savings account, they are asked if any of the money 
in these accounts is designated specifically for school purposes, like paying for college. This is a dichotomous variable with 
response options including, yes and no. Data for this variable is available from the 2002 CDS. 
 
Young adult‖s traditional savings 2007: Children ages 18 to 22 are asked whether or not they have a checking or savings account 
in their name. This is a dichotomous variable with response options including, yes and no. Data for this variable is available 
from the 2007 CDS.  
 
Young adult‖s traditional savings amount 2007. In the 2007 TA, savings amount is a continuous variable ranging from $.01 to 
$9,999,996. 
 
Race, gender, marital status, class and wealth variables. There are six control variables: children‖s race, gender, head‖s marital 
status, education level, and household income and household net worth.    
 
Children‖s race, a dichotomous variable (black/white), is available from the 1997 wave of the CDS. Children‖s gender is also a 
categorical variable (male/female), which is available from the 2002 wave of the CDS. Head‖s marital status (married/not 
married) is available from the 2001 wave of the PSID.  
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Head‖s education level is a continuous variable ranging from 1 to 16 and is available from the 2003 wave of the PSID. Each 
number represents a year of completed schooling. For example, a head of household who has 12 years of education is considered 
to have graduated from high school. Head‖s education is changed into a categorical variable, dividing heads into three groups: 
those with a high school degree or less, those with some college, and those with a four-year degree or more.  
 
Household income is calculated by averaging family income for 1993, 1997 and 2002. Income averaged over multiple years 
provides the best estimate of permanent income (Blau, 1999; Mayer, 1997). Next household income is changed into a variable 
with three groups: low-income (<$33,377), modest-income ($33,377 to $84, 015), and high-income ($84,016 or more).5 Income is 
inflated to 2007 price levels using the Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
 
Net worth in the PSID is a continuous variable that sums separate household values for a business, checking or savings 
accounts, real estate, stocks, and other assets, and subtracts out credit card and other debt. In this analysis, net worth does not 
include home equity. Net worth is averaged for 1994, 1999, and 2001. It is then changed into a variable with the following three 
categories: negative net worth (< $0), modest net worth ($0~$10,000), and high net worth (>$10,000).6 Net worth was inflated 
to 2007 price levels using the Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
  
Analysis plan. In the first stage of the analysis, missing data are replaced using multiple imputations. Missing data might result 
in limitations regarding generalizability of the findings and model comparisons as well as reduced power (Rubin, 1976). 
Multiple imputation has been recognized as a preferred method for estimating and completing missing data (Little & Rubin, 
2002). This method assumes that missing data occur randomly. To accurately complete missing data, multiple imputations use 
information from the observed variables as well as the missing data. The Markov Chain Monte Carlo method is performed to 
create five completed, or imputed, datasets with no missing data (Saunders, Morrow-Howell, Spitznagel, Doré, Proctor, and 
Pescarino, 2006; Schafer & Graham, 2002). In the second stage of the analysis, the results are then pooled across the five 
imputed datasets to reduce bias in the estimations of parametric statistics (Saunders et al. 2006). In the third and final stage, 
basic frequencies and means are estimated.  
  
                                                          
5 Category amounts are based on those used in the US Census Bureau―s Current Population Report Income in the United States: 2002 (De 
Navas-Walt, Cleveland, & Webster, 2002). De-Navas-Walt et al. (2002) used five income categories; we recoded into three categories to 
increase the sample size within each group. 
6 These categories are used in work done by Nam and Huang (2009). 
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